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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS: 
Caitlin Kear: Doug Ramseur will be starting us off.  He is the 
capital defender for central Virginia.  He is a 
graduate of James Madison University and right 
here at T.C. Williams School of Law. He practiced 
for seven years with Bowen, Bryant, Champlin & 
Carr in Richmond before being named the Deputy 
Capital Defender for Central Virginia in 2003. He 
then became a Senior Staff Attorney with the Of-
fice of the Georgia Capital defender and became 
the Capital Defender for Central Virginia this year. 
We also have Mike Herring, Commonwealth At-
torney for the City of Richmond. He was sworn in 
in 2006 and prior to that was a partner in the law 
firm of Bricker & Herring where he practiced 
criminal law and medical malpractice law. He is 
the first African American president of the Rich-
mond Bar Association and also actively involved in 
the law school here as well. 
We also have Shawn Armbrust who is the Execu-
tive Director of the Mid-Atlantic Innocence Pro-
ject. She is a graduate of Georgetown University 
Law Center and Northwestern University. 
And, moderating today we have Professor Mary 
Tate, Director of the Actual Innocence program, 
here at Richmond. She graduated from the Univer-
sity of Virginia School of Law in 1991 and clerked 
for Judge Merhige in the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia. We are very thankful for all of her help put-
ting on a symposium and her moderating purposes 
today will be to kind of keep us on track and keep 
us on time. So Professor Tate if you would like to 
start us off. 
PANEL DISCUSSION: 
Tate: Yes, well thank you everyone for, making time in 
your busy schedules to be here. JOLPI has done a 
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wonderful job and special thanks to all of our 
guests who are extraordinarily busy folks and it is 
very generous for you to come. I am going to pass 
the baton to Doug Ramseur, he is going to be 
speaking for about 12-15 minutes, each panelist 
will have that same allotted time and then around 
1:30-1:35 I am going to be the bouncer and make 
the Question & Answers session open up if they go 
a little long, but I don’t anticipate that.  
Tate:   Ok, thank you Doug. 
Ramseur:  Yeah, thank you. I want to say that it’s really an 
honor to come back and speak at the law school 
that I was able to attend and on such a distin-
guished panel here  
You know when I got the call to come and speak 
for on this this panel for talking about sort of inno-
cence issues and wrongful convictions, I’ll be frank 
with you, I kind of deferred at first. I think Caitlin 
will tell you, that I kind of deferred at first because 
I did not think I was the right person for it, because 
I am just going to be upfront and say I hate inno-
cent clients, okay. 
I absolutely hate having them, they are the worst 
possible kind of client you can have. And you 
know I was surprised when I, when I first started 
doing criminal defense, I’ve done criminal defense 
for my entire career, and I was kind of shocked 
when I started doing it, how often I had clients that 
I felt like were either (a) not guilty of what they 
were charged with, or (b) not guilty of as severe an 
offense of what they were charged with, and it was 
really kind of surprising to me how often that hap-
pened. 
And originally you go into this, and you think, you 
want to help people who are innocent, and that’s a 
great calling. I've actually learned to realize what I 
really like doing is helping guilty people, because 
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there is no way to win with an innocent client. Un-
fortunately, when they come to you and they are 
factually innocent, they are going through an awful 
process. A criminal justice system that does not be-
lieve they are innocent. As much as we talk about 
the presumption of innocence that people are pre-
sumed innocent until proven guilty without a rea-
sonable doubt, that is not how our system, and our 
society looks at this. 
I don't think anyone when they hear about a hor-
rific crime and the next day on the news they hear 
they arrested someone for it - everyone sort of 
goes, oh, thank god, they've caught the person who 
did it, because that is our assumption and what we 
think of people in that situation. So when you have 
someone who is innocent they are going to go 
through what is a really difficult situation that they 
should not have been put through. And then, if that 
person gets convicted of the crime you feel awful, 
you feel like you as a lawyer have failed in your 
obligation to them, and that you have not done the 
things that you should have done, and that respon-
sibility weighs on you. 
And if you’re successful for that person and you’re 
able to get their charges dismissed or get a resolu-
tion for them, that gets them back to their family 
and their lives, they have still gone through this 
traumatic experience, and all you did was kind of 
what you were supposed to do, right? There isn’t 
much joy in freeing an innocent person often times 
before trial because it’s just what was supposed to 
have happened, and it was a break down in the sys-
tem, regardless.  It gets, it gets tough to represent 
them throughout, one of the problems you have 
with innocent clients is, they have a complete in-
ability to share remorse for a crime they didn’t 
commit? And so they come across, in the system, 
as remorseless criminals, because they will not take 
responsibility for what’s happened, and it can be 
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difficult with a system that wants them to be bent 
in a different way, and so you find it very difficult 
as a lawyer to please a client like that. They are un-
happy in the jail. They’re unhappy separated from 
their family. They’re unhappy with every part of 
the process that is working wrongfully against 
them, and it’s hard, as a lawyer, because one of the 
things we’re taught as lawyers is how to get resolu-
tions in cases, how do we figure out a way to make 
all sides get what they need out of it, and that can 
be very, very difficult with innocent clients... be-
cause they’re often unwilling to compromise. Our 
criminal justice system is certainly set up to en-
courage plea agreements and resolutions in cases, 
more than it is trials.  
And there’s benefit to plea agreements and resolu-
tions, and when you have a client who is innocent 
and who you believe is innocent sometimes, you 
have to have very difficult conversations with them 
about what the reality is, of their chances of suc-
cess. I go in and when I approach cases, very much 
from the beginning, I do not come in and ask a cli-
ent from the get go, you know, what happened, tell 
me what you did, are you guilty, are you not guilty, 
because I’ve just decided it doesn’t matter to me as 
much anymore. What matters to me is, can they 
prove the case against you.  And if I have a client 
that insists to me that they are actually innocent, 
I’ll say that, that’s great, but if they can prove that 
you’re guilty of this, and I believe they’re going to 
find you guilty of it, then we need to find a way to 
lessen your exposure of this.  And that is really dif-
ficult and painful.  It’s not as idealistic as I like to 
be, it is pragmatic and practical, and it’s not why I 
came to do this, but I want to help people through 
it, and I have, unfortunately, had more situations 
than I would care for, where I feel like I have con-
vinced someone who may have been acquitted at 
trial, might be innocent, that they should take a 
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resolution that is not that they’re found not guilty, 
but sometimes it might be a plea agreement, and 
that’s really hard, but it’s a reality that we face 
when the rubber actually hits the road in our sys-
tem.   
And, so what I tell people is innocent clients are 
the kind that turn defense attorneys into alcoholics, 
because you end up stressed out all the time, wor-
ried that you’re not going to do enough, that you 
haven’t done enough, to get this client what they 
need.  And you’re worried that that client is in 
prison, for something that they didn’t do, when you 
could have done something better, and it’s hard to 
quiet those demons in your head. So that’s why I 
love guilty clients, and it’s what I wish they all 
were because they’re normally just people who are 
good people who have made a bad decision, that 
has put them in a bad place, and they’re willing to 
take some responsibility for that most of the time, 
and they’re happy with any benefit they get, and 
any little thing you do for them they really appreci-
ate, and if you lost, then they were kind of guilty 
anyway, so, it’s ok, you don’t have to end sucking 
down Xanax for a whole night to get over it. 
That being said, there is no doubt that the work 
that’s being done, to try to prevent those wrongful 
convictions from happening, is so important.  
We’re never going to finish that work, and there’s 
always going to be people who need to do it, and, 
we have to think about how do we, my focus is 
completely trial oriented, I don’t do post conviction 
work, I know Ms. [Armbrust] does that, and every-
thing I do is how do I keep people, to get them the 
best resolution that I can pending trial. And, there, 
what we’ve seen in is and other people have taught 
this better than I, is the shortcoming that we have 
in our trial system.  It is not perfect, it is never go-
ing to be perfect, there are a lot of problems that we 
have in it, some of those may be inherent in the 
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system, you may never be able to fix those prob-
lems, but we’ve had them illuminated in a way that 
I hope would open people’s eyes more, to the grand 
problems, I know there was talk earlier about fo-
rensic science, and I know that we’ll have some 
talk here about DNA and exonerations, and people 
will be discussing that. And the DNA exonerations 
have been great in that they have illuminated a 
problem, but there are some people who I think 
worry that that shows our systems working because 
we now have these DNA exonerations and forensic 
science that can solve our problems. When what I 
see, the reality is, how few cases that I'm involved 
in on a daily basis that have DNA that is disposi-
tive of the case. That is DNA evidence, that means, 
if you did it, this is your DNA right? And only the 
person who did its DNA is right here.  The vast 
majority of cases, there is never any DNA or foren-
sic science evidence that is dispositive of whether 
or not a person is innocent or guilty.  And what we 
know is in those cases where DNA, there's a large 
number of people that turn out to be factually inno-
cent.  They weren't the ones who did it.  And we 
have to extrapolate that out to the remainder of 
those 98% of cases where there isn't ever going to 
be DNA.  There is rarely ever going to be DNA 
evidence in a drug case, in larceny cases.  Most 
times, they're not even trying to collect that kind of 
evidence in those cases.  But we see people being 
convicted on the basis of things that we know are 
problematic from DNA exonerations. We know 
that the leading causes for wrongful convictions at 
trials are eyewitness misidentification, We know 
that through the DNA exonerations.  Well, we're 
relying on those eyewitness identifications in most 
of those other 98% of cases, often times, when we 
know how misleading they are, and we're not chal-
lenging those as well as we need to. 
 178 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST  [Vol. XIX:iii 
We know through those DNA exonerations that 
many of these are involving informant testimony. 
But we have these jailhouse informants who have 
become an epidemic of people who are trying to 
get their own sentences reduced or getting some 
benefit because while they testify against someone 
else and they're leading to an enormous amount of 
wrongful convictions.  I have been, doing this work 
for almost twenty years now, and I have been 
shocked more recently how often I have seen cases 
that had zero forensic evidence in them and were 
almost completely based on the back of jailhouse 
informants.  People who said my client told them 
that he committed this murder while they were in 
jail together and there is no other corroboration of 
this.  And I have done a great deal of research into 
this in Virginia and discovered and uncovered a 
specific network of informants who were lying and 
concocting evidence so that they could get their 
own sentences reduced.  If they testify against 
someone else it will get their sentence reduced and 
the other person will go to jail for it. It is happening 
and it is dangerous.  And it's not just in Virginia. 
California's recently had a huge scandal on the use 
of undercover, of jailhouse informants in particular. 
And how it has become rampant as a way to say, 
“I'll get someone else to do my time for me.” And 
these existing cases were frankly, the police and 
the prosecutors know they don't have the strongest 
case sometimes, because there isn't DNA evidence.  
It's the weakest cases that end up, sometimes, lead-
ing to wrongful convictions because they turn to 
the least reliable evidence. 
But unfortunately juries believe this kind of evi-
dence. You know studies have shown that jurors 
believe jailhouse informants. They believe that 
people talk in the jail.  And it is extremely hard to 
disprove that you had a conversation with someone 
in a jail, or you said something.  And so that leads 
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us, and we should realize that we need to be much 
more critical when we do that.  There's great work 
being done, by certainly the Virginia Department 
of Forensic Science, I'm not going to bad mouth 
them here, they do great work independently.  But 
we have seen unreliable junk science coming in in 
cases throughout the country. Massachusetts has 
recently had a problem where they have—they had 
their analysts who were falsifying drug reports, in 
the analysis drug reports.  One analyst who was us-
ing the drugs that came in herself and then falsify-
ing the reports from that. The way we uncover 
those things, and sometimes we uncover it through 
great audits and great government, things that are 
there, but I believe my role in the system is to be a 
check on that power.  To be the one who goes back 
and looks to see where those problems are. 
I have a controversial job where I defend people 
the state's trying to execute, and some people might 
not appreciate the work I do all the time.  And I 
have those uncomfortable situations where I'm at a 
cocktail party or maybe I've just buckled in on that 
four-hour cross-country flight.  Where the person 
next to me asks what do I do for a living, and the 
last thing I want to do is start this discussion that I 
can't get away from for four hours. And so what I 
tell people is I'm quality control for the government 
because it sounds pretty boring.  And it doesn't 
really go past that.  But that really is a lot of what I 
do.  My job is to make sure that the government 
does its job correctly—that they dot their "I"s and 
cross their "T'"s.  That they abide by the constitu-
tion, they abide by the rules and the laws, and they 
don't cut corners. It's really my favorite part of my 
job is to be able to shine a light on those things.  
And many of the problems that we've seen, you 
know this lab in Massachusetts that had a problem, 
that's come to light because defense attorneys were 
allowed to investigate those things. Because we did 
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our job and we went back in and reinvestigated 
what happened there. 
And I have concerns that in Virginia in particular, 
we're not allowing defense attorneys to do this well 
enough.  And the biggest way and, what I want to 
talk about a little bit is that Virginia has an utter 
lack of discovery in the criminal justice system 
here.  And Mike and I were on recently on a com-
mittee from the Supreme Court looking at reform, 
in the criminal discovery process, along with Pro-
fessor John Douglass, who’s at this University.  I 
don't know how many of you know this about Vir-
ginia, some of you practice know, in Virginia a de-
fendant is only entitled to receive from the prosecu-
tion any statements that they have already made to 
a law enforcement officer. They are entitled to get 
a copy of their own criminal record, and they are 
entitled to lab certificates, so certificates of analysis 
from the lab.  So if you were a criminal defendant 
in Virginia, charged with a crime, charged with 
murder, charged with capital murder, you are not 
entitled to have a list of the witnesses who are go-
ing to testify against you.  You're not entitled to 
have the statements that those witnesses have given 
the police. You are not allowed to have the police 
reports about what the police think.  Now there are 
some jurisdictions, like Mr. Herring’s in Rich-
mond, at their discretion because they realize the 
importance of having an informed defense on both 
sides, but it's not required.  And there are plenty of 
jurisdictions in Virginia that say you will only get 
the bare minimum and nothing else. 
 So that means in a criminal case in Virginia, a capi-
tal murder case, I may have had no idea who the 
witnesses are even going to be, before they are 
called. And so, Mike and I were on a committee 
along with Professor Douglas and a number of 
other people from around the state, who have 
called for expansion of those rules.  To allow for 
 2016]		 2015 SYMPOSIUM: WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS KEYNOTE PANEL	 181	
reciprocity, if it were a civil case we would be able 
to have depositions and interrogatories.  We would 
know everything that happened if we were arguing 
about money.  But when argue about people's lives, 
we don't get that. 
There are lots of other problems about the low rates 
of compensation that we have for attorneys, doing 
court appointed work.  Again, the vast majority of 
defendants who come into our criminal justice sys-
tem, and I would probably say the vast majority of 
people that the "Innocence Project" and other peo-
ple are working for, were indigent, they were rep-
resented by court appointed lawyers.  And some 
court appointed lawyers do great work and do a 
great job.  Some of them unfortunately, don't. And 
the defendant doesn't get to choose which one he 
gets. He gets the person who is assigned to him to 
do that work. 
In Virginia, I looked this up recently because I 
wanted to double check, if you are charged with a 
class two felony, that is first degree murder in Vir-
ginia, the statutory rate for the lawyer who defends 
you, is $1,235. Now you can apply for a waiver, 
that can get you an additional $850, if it was a spe-
cial needs kind of case, where it required extra, and 
if it really required extra you can ask for more than 
that.  But what that says is that in Virginia, we have 
decided that the run of the mill ordinary first de-
gree murder case, that should be able to be de-
fended by a defense attorney for $1,200. That it is 
shameful and ludicrous to think that that's how we 
value the job of people in murder cases for the de-
fense that way.  And we need to, and the other 
thing that happens is, you get that $1,235, any 
waiver above that you can get approved for, with 
approval of a judge, sometimes the Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court has to approve it.  But it's also 
only until they run out of the money, and every 
year they seem to run out of money at the end of 
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the fiscal year.  Come April or May, some of the 
lawyers are hearing no more waiver money is go-
ing to be allowed for you.  So if you were a defense 
attorney whose defending that person, you’re just 
out of luck, on getting paid any additional money.  
You are only ever going to get that $1,235, no mat-
ter how much time you put in it.  It means that we 
don't give incentives for the defense attorney to go 
that extra effort.  So I'm going to wrap up, those are 
my main thoughts and concerns that I wanted to 
share about things we can do to help prevent 
wrongful convictions because I would much rather 
prefer we be in a position where I don't have to rep-
resent innocent people anymore and have some real 
reforms that will make that better and make our 
system work better.  So thank you.  I look forward 
to hearing what you have to say. 
Tate: Thank you Doug. 
Herring:   So I'm going to defer to my good friend, Mary, to 
allow time for me to comment on something that 
I'm going loosely call an eeyore.  The eloquence of 
Ramseur. I'm always, whether I agree with Doug or 
not, I'm always captivated by what he says and I 
tend to think more about it after the fact, than I 
like.  And I'm sure I'll do that today.  I really am 
going to share with you, my personal experience 
from innocence cases.  I've done lots of work in 
lots of different settings, and in many different ca-
pacities.  And I'll defer again to Mary, on the extent 
to which she wants to touch on that throughout the 
course of our panel. But for the course of these ten 
minutes, it’s going to be fairly narrow. 
When Caitlin invited me to participate in your 
panel and she shared with me the topic of our dis-
cussion, it made me pause, because I didn’t really 
know what that meant.  “The human experience.”  
So she and I corresponded a bit and she asked me if 
I was going to be able to frame my impression of it.  
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And I did, I did my best and I told her that my ex-
perience with these cases cause me to feel a sense 
of panicked anxiety, right?  And I don’t mean that 
jokingly. I’m dead serious about it. And I’ll give 
you examples of three scenarios in which I had this 
sense of panicked anxiety.  The first, oddly enough, 
was when I was defense attorney, twelve, thirteen 
years ago, and I was representing John Otis Lin-
coln, the fellow who did the crimes that Marvin 
Anderson was wrongfully convicted of.  And what 
was odd about my representation of Lincoln was 
that I was working with this wonderful lawyer in 
Hanover, Michael Clower, and Mike and I would 
go out and see Lincoln, and John, you know, was a 
hulk of a man who had lost one of his fingers be-
cause he had tried to, anybody remember MASH?  
Remember Klinger?  Klinger wanted a Section 8.  
Well, John had convinced himself that he could get 
the equivalent of a Section 8 by cutting off the cir-
culation to his finger.  So he put a rubber band on it 
and it went necrotic and died, but he didn’t get out, 
he just lost half his finger. 
 So I’m sitting in the room with this guy who’s a 
self induced amputee, and he was a perfectly cor-
dial, rational, well-behaved client, who, several 
years before this trial had come back through one 
of Brant’s cold hits, had come to court and con-
fessed to the crimes Marvin was convicted for.  
Except that in the process of confessing, he also 
called the judge and everybody there “Klansman,” 
so he lost his credibility.  True story.  You know, 
he railed them as all being horrible Hanover racists, 
and so they all thought he was a raving idiot.  Well, 
we then have to cross-examine Marvin Anderson, 
who we know to be innocent, in our efforts to rep-
resent, zealously represent, John Otis Lincoln.  And 
so I felt panicked and anxious because I really was 
at a loss of what to do to ethically, and adequately, 
and zealously, represent Lincoln.  Consider, I have 
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to cross examine a man in such a way to suggest 
that he may have in fact been guilty of something 
that I now know and that the science tells me he 
didn’t do.  It felt horrible. 
Fast forward.  I met Shawn [Armbrust] several 
years ago, but got to know her better in the context 
of our last two cases, the first of which was Tho-
mas Haynesworth and the more recent was Michael 
McAlister.  Many of you folks, many of the 
younger folks probably don’t know Law and Order, 
but those of us who are my generation remember it 
from its earlier versions.  And in every Law and 
Order moment, in every Law and Order episode 
there was this scene or scenario where the prosecu-
tor is sitting in the room with the client and the de-
fense lawyer.  And all the defense lawyers in the 
audience, in the room, will be going, “That never 
happens.  It never happens.”  And it’s true, it never 
happens, except two times in my life.  I’ve had two 
Law and Order moments.  And they’ve both been 
Armbrust clients, and it’s not because Armbrust is 
a bad lawyer, quite the contrary.  Alright?  In Hay-
nesworth’s case, I go out to, was it Greenville?  
Greenville, and, we don’t have time, we may later, 
but in essence Haynesworth had been wrongfully 
convicted for sexually assaulting a few women that 
it turned out Leon Davis had actually offended 
against. 
Well, I go in and I meet Haynesworth, and about 
five minutes into the encounter, I’m sitting in the 
room with this guy, and the hair starts to go up, and 
I’m not a hairy guy, but I feel what I think to be 
hair going up on my arms.  And I’ve had this feel-
ing before when I’ve been in the room with preda-
tors, especially when I was doing capital work, and 
I’m trying to defend guys, who I know did it, but 
I’ve got to defend the guys, right?  Well this is a 
strange feeling, but this time it was a little bit of a 
 2016]		 2015 SYMPOSIUM: WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS KEYNOTE PANEL	 185	
sweat, and the tingle, because I knew I was sitting 
in the room with an innocent guy. 
And it’s probably hubris, on my part, to think I 
know when I’m in the presence of someone who is 
telling the truth. But I swear, I knew it. And then he 
takes his polygraph and I think he passes his poly-
graph and at that moment I thought: “uh oh, now 
what?” Really. Because all we had at that point was 
my personal sense that he was innocent, Shawn’s 
insistence that he was innocent, and this inadmissi-
ble polygraph evidence. And as Shawn will tell you 
later, just by twist of fate, things work out. But she 
tells that part a bit better than I. 
And then more recently with McAlister - I’m look-
ing at my clock - McAlister and Haynesworth 
couldn’t be more different. Haynesworth, I still run 
into in the courthouse. I mean he’s this handsome, 
almost country but he’s not, just an unassuming 
guy. He walks around, I swear it looks like he’s got 
a Sony Walkman, because they’re big headphones - 
they are not little earphones. And it would make 
sense because when Haynesworth went away, this 
little earphones and smartphone technology didn’t 
exist. Well so he walks around with this thing, and 
he comes in and out of the courthouse working 
over at the AG’s office and he has this beautiful 
demeanor about him. And I don’t get it, I’d be bit-
ter as Hell! I’m telling you I’d be bitter as Hell if 
the system put me away wrongfully for eighteen 
years. This guy is such a big man, and such a beau-
tiful person, that he tried to give me a Christmas 
gift, years ago. He tried to give several people in 
the courthouse $50 bills for Christmas, right? 
McAlister —not a bad man, but a bit of a broken 
man. You know, his life had been marked by alco-
holism. He’d had some run-ins with the law, so I 
didn’t have the warm and fuzzy feeling in the room 
with McAlister. Until there was this tense standoff 
 186 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST  [Vol. XIX:iii 
almost because I needed to talk to him and I needed 
to do it and not pay attention to her [Shawn] or our 
co-counsel, Jim Bensfield, at all. And so they were 
kind enough to literally stand off to the side while 
McAlister and I just sat there and talked, right? 
And he got to a point where he was on the verge of 
tears, and he eventually said, you know, “look...” - 
the equivalent of it was: “I’ve done some F’d up 
things in my life, truly. But this wasn’t one of 
‘em.” And that point, the panicked anxiety came 
back. Because I knew—I knew, we had the wrong 
guy, we didn’t have polygraph evidence and he 
was a broken man. So he was an unsympathetic, 
wrongfully convicted person. But, lest we all feel 
really good about this—let me reduce this to the 
reality of the real world for you. Shawn and I can 
have an exchange over one of our cases, almost in 
isolation, in a vacuum. The dynamic that Doug 
shares with you, though, about the routine, run-of-
the-mill case, that Zerkin has or some of the other 
lawyers had, poses a different challenge. And here 
it is: we are charged, he is charged with represent-
ing his clients zealously. He can’t come into my of-
fice, though, and claim actual innocence for every 
defendant, because if he does, eventually he be-
comes the boy who is crying wolf. Well, how does 
he choose which client to advocate actual inno-
cence for? And so if he isn’t advocating for the ac-
tual innocence of every defendant, is he commit-
ting malpractice? Is he underrepresenting the 
people that he just comes in and engages in great 
discovery and plea negotiations for? Is he coming 
in and saying, “I’m advocating for innocence-
light?” Conviction integrity units within offices is 
probably the way to do it. But it is not conviction 
integrity units, in the way that that term has come 
to be known today. And as time allows, we’ll talk 
about that. 
Tate:  Wonderful. Beautiful remarks. Thank you. Shawn? 
 2016]		 2015 SYMPOSIUM: WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS KEYNOTE PANEL	 187	
Armbrust:  Hi there. Thank you so much for having me today. 
As the non-trial lawyer on the panel today, I have 
notes. But I have been the executive director of the 
Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project for ten years. And 
prior to law school did wrongful convictions work 
at the Center on Wrongful Convictions at North-
western and as a college student. So I've seen these 
cases for a long time and they're all wildly differ-
ent. But if I'm going to pull apart a common thread 
in all these cases and an overarching lesson that 
I've seen in these cases, it is that the system really 
isn’t equipped to deal with wrongful convictions. 
I'm sort of the depressing corollary to Doug's 
commentary about how the system isn't prepared to 
deal with innocent people before trial. It's also not 
equipped to deal with them very well after trial. 
We’ve seen 330 DNA exonerations, more than 150 
death row exonerations, and people have made in-
credible efforts at preventing wrongful convictions 
and at trying to make them easier to correct. But, at 
the end of the day, it hasn't gone as far as it needs 
to go. We're still operating in the system in which 
it's virtually impossible to overturn convictions, 
and in which the human costs of that are often 
overlooked as people focus on finality and on proc-
ess. 
We prize finality, we typically assume that juries of 
gotten it right at trial, and we don't favor re-
litigating facts. The system would break if we had 
to re-litigate facts in every case. And so what 
we’ve leaned toward is re-litigating facts in virtu-
ally no cases. We also have a byzantine post trial 
process. And we don't have enough time today to 
talk about the post-trial process; I think Brandon 
Garrett will get into it. But, it's not set up to litigate 
guilt or innocence very well. It's set up with proce-
dural hurdles in place that make it incredibly diffi-
cult for claims of innocence to be heard on the mer-
its in court. And so what this means, practically, in 
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my cases is that I have to have both overwhelming 
proof of innocence, and I also have to have either 
an extraordinary confluence of lucky events or an 
extraordinary confluence of people. So you need 
Mike Herring, you need Alice Armstrong, who's 
back there, you need people who are really willing 
to go the extra mile, and do things that most people 
on their positions aren't willing to do. And I would 
say to you that's not a system. It's great that I've 
been exposed to so many wonderful people doing 
this work, and I love that aspect of my work, but 
that's not a system we can rely on to correct wrong-
ful convictions. 
I tell people who ask what I actually do on a day-
to-day basis that I'm more of a political campaign 
manager than a lawyer much of the time. I spend a 
lot of my time strategizing about relationships. I 
strategize about media. I strategize about how to 
convince political actors to do what I need them to 
do for my clients and make it look like it's in their 
interest. Very little of that requires spending time 
on Westlaw, reading cases. That has to be done, but 
at the end of the day what tends to get the clients 
out of prison is having those extraordinary people 
who are willing to say the legal standard is maybe a 
little lower than it is or turn away when there's a 
procedural issue they could raise. 
I don't want to spend a lot of my time telling war 
stories. I hate doing that, but that's what I'm about 
to do. Because I do want to illustrate that point 
through a few case examples. The first example is 
the case of Thomas Haynesworth, which Mike 
talked about. In Thomas' case we had an extraordi-
nary group of people who believed in his inno-
cence. We had Mike, we had Wade Kizer, the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney of Henrico County, be-
cause Thomas's case spanned two jurisdictions. We 
had Alice Armstrong in the Attorney General's of-
fice. We had Ken Cuccinelli in the Attorney Gen-
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eral’s office.  And yet, once we had filed our writ 
of actual innocence there was one oral argument – 
in which Alice argued on our side. After that argu-
ment the court sua sponte decided that it wanted to 
go en banc. And so we went en banc. I argued, 
along with General Cuccinelli himself, and we still 
only won by one vote. Even after everyone had 
agreed that Thomas was innocent, there was actu-
ally no way to get him out of prison in Virginia. 
So, we were lucky we were able to finagle a way of 
doing it. But, from the point where everyone 
agreed he was innocent to the point where he was 
exonerated, it was ten months. If we hadn’t been 
able to actually get him out through backdoor 
channels, he would have sat in prison for another 
ten months while the case was being litigated – 
even though no one thought he had committed the 
crime. And so that is one example of an instance 
where the system ultimately looked like it did the 
right thing because the right result was achieved, 
but it’s hard to say that that’s a system we want to 
have in place...that you have to operate through 
backdoor channels and political pressure and hope 
that a majority of the Court of Appeals will eventu-
ally see your way even if it’s arguable that you ac-
tually do meet the legal standard in the case. 
 The second case is the case of Jonathan Montgom-
ery. Jonathan Montgomery was convicted of a sex-
ual assault in which the victim didn’t come—I 
guess the complaining witness—didn’t come for-
ward until five months—five years after the crime. 
So when the case went to trial it was  a “he said she 
said” case –bench trial, judge convicts, and he goes 
to prison. Several years later, the complaining wit-
ness was actually working as a civilian in the po-
lice department. She is racked with guilt. She con-
fesses to a friend, who happens to be a police 
officer. He says, “I’m a police officer, I have an 
obligation to do something about this,” so he does. 
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She’s charged with perjury. The Commonwealth’s 
Attorney in Hampton does the right thing—takes 
the information to the trial lawyer who represented 
Mr. Montgomery. 
Unfortunately, they then went to the circuit court 
and got the conviction vacated. The reason I say 
“unfortunately,” is because in Virginia, the circuit 
court loses jurisdiction over the case after twenty-
one days. And so the order is taken to the Depart-
ment of Corrections and the Department of Correc-
tions says, “that’s weird, we don’t really see these.” 
They hand it to the attorney at the Attorney Gen-
eral’s Office who works with the Department of 
Corrections, who doesn’t know what the order is, 
and looks at the order and says, “well that’s an ille-
gal order, you shouldn’t enforce that because it was 
an illegal order.” At this point there is a media fire-
storm. When I get involved in the case, the family 
on one hand was very happy to have me but on the 
other hand was going, “wait a minute, why are you 
working with this Attorney General’s Office that  is 
now trying to keep me in prison?” I’m trying to ex-
plain to the client and his family that look, I under-
stand that everybody thinks you’re innocent and 
that someone tried to order you to be released but 
that actually was illegal, so you’re going to have to 
sit in prison for a little while longer while we try to 
get you out. Trying to explain this to this client and 
explain why it’s rational is pretty tough because it 
isn’t all that rational. And again, luckily there were 
wonderful people involved in this case—Marla 
Decker, now Judge Decker, was in the Governor’s 
Office. She took the case to me. She made sure we 
got him out as quickly as possible. Once again, Al-
ice Armstrong in the Attorney General’s Office 
worked with us on the case, argued on our side. We 
won, but again, is that a system you really want in 
your state? 
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And the last example is the McAlister case. The 
McAlister case is one that has been hard, because 
of course by the time I got involved in the case in 
2014, both the person who had arrested Mr. McAl-
ister for attempted rape in 1986 and the person who 
prosecuted him had believed that he was innocent 
for more than 20 years. But Mr. McAlister still re-
mained convicted of that offense and Virginia was 
moving forward to civilly commit him as a sexual 
violent predator, which likely would have kept him 
in prison for the rest of his life. And when I started 
looking at the case I took it both to Mike and to Al-
ice and I said, “well, I really think this guy’s inno-
cent. So let’s talk about the facts first...I really 
think he’s innocent but it’s not really newly dis-
covered because people started hearing about this 
evidence before trial ended. It’s not really ineffec-
tive assistance because his lawyer did kind of ask 
about it at trial, and it’s not Brady because it sort of 
was disclosed at the time of trial.” So there actually 
was no viable legal remedy to get Mr. McAlister 
out of prison, even though no one involved in the 
conviction believed that he was guilty. And once 
again we were lucky. We were able to secure a 
pardon, and that was great. And we were able to 
get him out of prison. But again, I don’t think you 
want to rely on a system in which you can’t actu-
ally use the criminal justice system to get an inno-
cent person out of prison and instead have to rely 
on a political process to get someone out of prison. 
So, sorry to be a downer. I’m usually not a downer. 
I think there are things we can do to make the sys-
tem better, and I love to talk about them in the 
questions. I think some of them could involve, I 
was just talking to Mike about potentially changing 
the Writ of Actual Innocence to allow for some 
kind of bail or bond if everybody involved agrees 
that the person is innocent. So I think there are 
things that we can do to make the system better. 
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But I think that when we see exonerations, we of-
ten look at them and say they are proof that the sys-
tem works, but often times they are proof that al-
though we manage to get the right result, there are 
still things we need to do to make the system better 
so you don’t need this confluence of unusually 
great people to make sure that the right result oc-
curs. 
Tate:   Wonderful. Thank you.  Wonderful. These com-
ments were just fantastic. And I am going to give 
the panel one minute to man any essential com-
ments that are a riff or an advance on what one of 
your co-panelists have said before we open it to 
questions. Are there any lose ends that you’d like 
to? —and we are going to keep it brief because our 
audience—I  know we have a hot bench of an audi-
ence. 
Ramseur:  Yes. I was struck a little bit by how much of we 
sort of talk about here is based on kind of a per-
son’s personal belief in innocence sometimes. And 
Mike Herring is one of the best, most amazing 
lawyers I know and I am so glad he is a prosecutor 
because we need more in the world like him. But 
when you think in some ways about how you come 
into a situation, and part of your sense of whether 
or not this person is worthy of relief, is your own 
personal belief as you talk to that person. 
And the idea that I think a lot of people have in our 
system, that we have the ability to be human poly-
graphs. First off, I don’t believe the electronic ones 
are worth anything, but that’s me. But I certainly—
I get lied to all the time. Everybody lies to me, 
okay. I mean everyday people lie to me. And one 
thing I have—we all think we are pretty good at 
spotting that and I’ve learned sometimes I just 
don’t know, all the time. You going to lie to me? 
That’s fine, lie to me. I mean, I’m going to do what 
I’m going to do. But we have a lot of times were 
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wrongful convictions happen in our system because 
someone has said, “I absolutely believe this person 
is guilty, the evidence isn’t there, but I 100 percent 
believe they are, and so it’s okay for me to cut this 
corner that then leads to the conviction.” And I 
don’t want us to be in a situation where we have to 
rely on that same sense to unconvict people some-
times.  And another prosecutor I have a tremendous 
amount of respect for in another jurisdiction re-
cently had a case that ended up blowing up. And it 
was a wrongful conviction. And one of the things 
that came out was this prosecutor said, “You know 
I was initially skeptical of the veracity of this com-
plaining witness when I read the police reports. I 
was skeptical. But then I met the person and I 
spoke to them in person. And I just really believed 
at that point in time that this crime had happened to 
them.” And then the prosecution went forward. The 
person got convicted. And it ultimately blew up 
months and months later. So we need to be careful. 
I want to believe my sense in it, but I also worry 
that we base this on our own ability to tell. 
 Tate:   Post conviction lawyers can commit the same sins 
that we decry in law enforcement in terms of tunnel 
vision, or confirmation bias, or all those things. 
Ramseur:   And I’ve had plenty times were I thought someone 
was innocent and they absolutely were not, come to 
find out. 
Armbrust:   My first DNA case. 
Tate:   So, unless Mike or Shawn have anything addi-
tional, time to open it to the audience. 
Herring:   You know I will say this. I think that’s a fair, it’s 
not so much a criticism, it’s a fair point. But I don’t 
know that we can, and I don’t know that we ought 
to, cleanse the justice system of the human compo-
nent. I tell you, because Shawn has highlighted the 
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system of coincidences.  Right? That’s what—
that’s your point? At the risk of oversimplifying. 
Armbrust:   Yeah. 
Herring:   Because of the system of coincidences, if I don’t 
have a personal investment in her client’s position I 
don’t know that I can be an effective advocate with 
Shawn. If it’s a purely technical position, Shawn 
and I probably stay on parallel adverse paths. Po-
lite, collegial, but adversarial paths. 
Tate:   We are going to open it to the audience. So if any-
one—we have two microphones on either side of 
the Moot Courtroom and please wave a hand and 
we will . . . 
Armbrust:   There is one in the balcony. 
Herring:   The first one’s open. 
Tate:   Oh we can’t get the microphone up there. Project 
loudly please. 
Participant:   I was wondering if anybody on the panel can 
comment on the role of disability in wrongful con-
victions.  Particularly, the impact of...disability of 
defendants during initial police encounters and dur-
ing interrogations. 
Ramseur:  Yeah, so I mean, we’ve seen a lot more recogni-
tion...and the question for anyone who didn’t hear 
was about disability and basically vulnerable de-
fendants that way. We’ve seen in my work, in capi-
tal work, because they’ve said you can no longer 
execute people who are intellectually disabled.  
Right?  We used to call them mentally retarded, we 
now call them intellectually disabled.  And, you 
can’t seek the execution of juveniles for the same 
reason: which is, they are vulnerable people.  We 
can still put them in prison for the rest of their lives 
though.  Right?  And they are still vulnerable to 
wrongful convictions for exactly the same reason 
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and some people would argue they actually get less 
relief sometimes when you’re only doing life in 
prison as opposed to a death penalty.  There are 
less people to come in to try and find out that you 
were wrongfully convicted. You know, there’s a 
reason why, you know, we look at the number of 
exonerations and there have been 150 exonerations 
from people who are on death row, but only 330 
DNA exonerations of everybody, completely here, 
because we give more scrutiny to that. 
It is certainly true that I think we need to make eve-
ryone more aware of mental health issues and the 
vulnerability that is there.  And people get involved 
in it more that way.  We’re seeing movement, I 
think, to recognizing, that, but it hasn’t stopped that 
unfortunately the breakdown in our mental health 
systems has led us to push those people to the 
criminal justice system instead, and led for more of 
that to happen.  And I think there’s trying to be 
greater awareness, and openness to it, but it hap-
pened, it’s an enormous risk.  And it’s hard again 
when someone can’t communicate with you, they 
can’t defend themselves well, they can’t explain 
something to you.  I have had a number of clients 
who are intellectually disabled, and I was often 
struck when I first met them, that I absolutely did 
not think they were intellectually disabled when I 
first met them.  In fact, I walked out of those meet-
ings going “That’s a really nice guy, he’s a client, 
he just agreed with everything I said.  He’s so 
smart.”  That was just their way of masking that 
they weren’t following anything I was saying. And 
as [a] lawyer, I’m used to talking to them and tell-
ing them what they should do.  And as a person 
who’s vulnerable they’re used to doing sometimes 
what they’re told. And it leads to a lot of injustice, 
and so it needs to be more awareness.  It was only 
after meeting those people several times that I real-
ized...and really getting their records...that they 
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were extremely vulnerable people.  And so, it just 
takes a lot more awareness to get there, and it’s 
tough. 
Tate:  Shawn? 
Armbrust: I think I see it come into play in a couple of differ-
ent ways.  The first very concrete way is in false 
confessions.  False confessions have been a factor 
in nearly a quarter of all post-conviction DNA ex-
onerations.  And although people with normal IQs 
can falsely confess, and do in many cases, if you 
are intellectually disabled or mentally ill, or a juve-
nile, you are much more likely to falsely confess.  
For exactly the reason you just talked about, which 
is that you are used to masking your disability or 
vulnerability by being extra compliant with author-
ity.  So it is much easier for police techniques that 
are designed to convince people that it’s rational to 
confess.  Those work in tandem with false confes-
sions more often when there is an intellectual dis-
ability or another vulnerability. 
Tate:  Or work for the poor. 
Armbrust:  Yeah, exactly. And then the second way I think it 
can come into place is that, you know, once you are 
convicted, once your direct appeal is concluded, 
you no longer have the right to counsel.  So, if you 
are a prisoner, you are making it through in Vir-
ginia state habeas, and federal habeas on your own.  
So if you are intellectually disabled, you may be 
able to get a jailhouse lawyer, and some of them 
actually aren’t bad.  They’re not the same as having 
a really good post-conviction lawyer. You’re 
forced to litigate that on your own, and there are 
people who have clerked on the Supreme Court 
who have a hard time figuring out federal habeas. 
It’s not exactly intuitive.  So if you’re intellectually 
disabled it’s particularly hard.  And even when 
you’re trying to get a lawyer, it can be challenging.  
People write to our office.  We get six hundred re-
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quests per year from people who want our help.  
We have a staff of four full-time and three part-
time employees, so we cannot talk to all six hun-
dred of those people.  We ask them to fill out a 
questionnaire.  And we try really hard, to look at 
those questionnaires, and say, okay clearly there’s 
something, this guy had a hard time filling it out, 
let’s send someone to talk to this person.  But as 
you said, you can’t always tell, and so the intellec-
tual disability makes them less strong communica-
tors and less able to advocate for themselves to get 
lawyers. And so it can lead to wrongful convic-
tions, but it can also make them more difficult to 
correct because you don’t have the means to actu-
ally do what you need to do to correct them. 
Tate:  The cases getting in the pipeline, that’s another 
system that’s just ad hoc because at the University 
of Richmond we have resources but not extensive 
resources, so what you’re doing is you’re triaging 
and you’re trying to, you know, make reasonable 
decisions about resources, and it’s very difficult but 
sometimes you can see markers even in a twenty 
six page questionnaire. 
Participant:  Good afternoon. One of the comments, I have and 
one of the things I see is that when you go to plea 
deals, a lot of times a defendant faces a multitude 
of charges and the plea deal sort of whittles it down 
to one or two charges and the plead guilty to it, and 
they miss that whole idea of a trial. What are your 
comments and I guess I really am focusing more 
towards Mike in terms of how that sort of causes 
problems in terms of how those people who plead 
guilty to things they might not necessarily want to 
plead guilty to. 
Herring:  I think the term that’s begun to be applied to this is 
“stacking charges.” I think I lean left of most of my 
peers as prosecutors, but even leaning left, I am a 
lawyer and I come to work every day to be an ad-
 198 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST  [Vol. XIX:iii 
vocate. And I try to make decisions and litigate 
strategically and I look for leverage the same way 
Doug does. If there’s probable cause for the charge, 
and if there is in fact an injury, it becomes tough 
for me to decide which charges I’m going to throw 
away and which I am going to litigate or use for 
leverage. What’s left out of the discussion on 
stacking charges, I think, is often, at least in the 
state system, offers, plea offers, that are much 
lower than the statutory plea range. So third of-
fense distribution, mandatory minimum ten years, 
the offer, if you’re in a jurisdiction that is sympa-
thetic to the argument that ten years is a draconian 
sentence, the offer is going to be less. It might be 
six. Well, when that person rejects the six years, 
the case goes to trial and he’s convicted and gets 
the ten or more. We look through the lens, you look 
in the rearview mirror of what happened to that 
case and you assume that he was a victim of 
stacked or leveraged charges that we took advan-
tage of his status as a third time dealer even though 
he only sold a twenty dollar rock. And it’s a very 
sympathetic case, very sympathetic fact pattern the 
twenty-dollar sale, but I don’t know how much you 
all expect me to negotiate against myself. I put a 
good offer on the table and he rejects it, do I put a 
better offer on the table? How much do I induce 
him to save himself? I do think though, in fairness, 
that we are going to, at least some jurisdictions are 
going be more willing to look at charging decisions 
just because of the impact of it. You see it in gun 
cases. Violent crimes involving guns, you can rack 
up much more mandatory gun time than you get on 
the actual substantive offense. And I don’t know 
that that was the intent of the legislature and we 
certainly don’t want to bear the cost of it. 
Tate:  May I tie this into your, I do think it’s related, your 
reference in your remarks, a little bit of a tickler on 
prosecutorial conviction integrity units. And you 
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said that there is this certain image and you might 
want to educate the audience of what that construct 
is but you seem to have a slightly different view or 
a variation on it, is that correct? 
Herring:  Yes. 
Tate:  Would you amplify? 
Herring:  In most discussions about conviction integrity 
units, the term sort of refers to this review of older 
cases. And so you’re going back and looking at 
your files going through this sort of quality control 
analysis. Well, one of my co-panelists made the 
earlier point that, Shawn did, I’d rather avoid a 
near miss than have to correct a wrong. Conviction 
integrity looking through the rearview mirror tries 
to right a wrong. I think if we’re going to avoid 
near misses you’ve got to set processes up in of-
fices that allow for some sort of critique, scrutiny, 
scrutinizing of the cases it’s moving through the 
system. Easy to say, hard to implement though be-
cause that means if Shawn and I are colleagues, 
Shawn’s looking over my shoulder to some degree 
at my work. And she might be looking over my 
shoulder and concluding that I’m not discharging 
my discovery obligation as she thinks the law re-
quires me to. And you can imagine how easy in 
theory it is to say “yeah you should do that” but the 
office, the dynamic in the office really becomes 
caustic. But I think that’s the only way that it 
works. There are jurisdictions that will speed up in 
California that have begun to do it. 
Tate:   Good, thank you. 
Participant:   Good afternoon, my name is [name omitted] and 
I’m a third year law student here at Richmond. It 
seems like one of the dangers of widely publicized 
actual innocence cases is that it can erode the pub-
lic trust in our criminal justice system, that we can 
get things right. Is there a way to design a system 
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that will allow those convicted to have more effec-
tive access to actual innocence claims without that 
erosion of public trust? 
Ramseur  Well, I agree with what Mike said earlier that there 
is still a human element to this and we have to rec-
ognize that because it’s a human institution, it 
makes mistakes. And the problem that we have is 
when we try to make a system, if we had a system 
that said “look, it is unfortunate that it makes mis-
takes and we will do our best to try to correct 
them,” then we would have at least some belief that 
while the system isn’t perfect, we work hard to fix 
it and we have processes that are in place to do 
that. What Shawn discussed then is how hard it is 
to get it fixed because our system values finality. It 
values the conviction. Don’t upset a conviction af-
ter it’s happened because everyone will want to, 
because defense attorneys like me will continue to 
try to fight for some client and never give up. And 
that was the problem and now there may have been 
some overcorrection. So, I agree it causes public 
confidence, what we need is to then talk about what 
are the processes like a conviction integrity unit or 
allowing for us to know there is some open avenue 
to vent those mistakes that happen and not make it 
like you’ve got to move the world to make it hap-
pen. Ensure that there’s a willingness to do that, 
which sometimes is tough to do. 
Armbrust:   I think one way of sort of avoiding the erosion of 
public trust, is if we are able to really show that 
we’re trying to learn lessons from wrongful convic-
tions. I think a lot of time when we talk about 
wrongful convictions we end up talking about 
blame, you know, who screwed up, who did some-
thing wrong. I don’t think that’s a super productive 
conversation if we’re trying to make the system 
better so that the system isn’t allowing for wrong-
ful convictions as often. I think it’s possible that if 
there were…when there are wrongful convictions, 
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if we do what some people are talking as a root 
cause analysis, a sentinel events review, there are 
all sorts of different terms that mean essentially the 
same thing. But what they are is taking what the 
field of medicine has used to look at error and do a 
review in a non-blaming way. To figure out what 
were the places in the process where the system 
failed. And taking those lessons and really trying to 
apply them. And I think if you can do that and 
show that you’re doing that, then the public could 
say “okay well the system makes mistakes, every 
system makes mistakes, it’s run by people, that 
happens.  But at least this system is learning from 
them and trying to become better.” And so that’s 
where I think you could take something that could 
erode public trust, and turn it into a way that could 
improve public trust in the system. 
Tate: And I wanted to add with Bryan Stevenson’s book 
Just Mercy, I think there’s an element with regard 
to legitimacy and problems on the public trust that 
he’s getting at and mass incarceration and policing 
videos, and what not. But I agree with Shawn that 
to frame it as structural problem solving is abso-
lutely essential and not to go in a blaming direc-
tion, but even if we take that tact, we as a democ-
racy have to admit that we are producing wrongful 
convictions that afflict the poor and racial minori-
ties at a higher rate. So that seems to me that it gets 
lost sometimes in discussions about the frontal pre-
trial problems. 
Herring:  I think that one problem that plagues the state sys-
tem, and I say this because of my limited experi-
ence in the federal system, but I have watched peo-
ple who work in the federal system, is that there is 
such an emphasis, if not premium, on the state sys-
tem on moving the case through. My great uncle 
used to say, “take your time.” Just the coolest dude 
in the world, “take your time.” But we just don’t in 
the state system. The federal system, on the other 
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hand, allows for good substantive tractive lawyer-
ing. Now again, it’s easy for me to sit here and 
criticize the system, but we’ve got swollen dockets 
and speedy trial statutes. The casualty of that sce-
nario though is, perhaps, the integrity of some of 
the outcomes. Pleadings. Wrongful convictions. So 
I don’t know that in the current framework, unless 
we agree to slow the entire state system down sig-
nificantly, you’re going to see an improvement in 
the quality of the outcomes. 
Participant:  I know the panel knows me, but for the people in 
the audience that don’t, I’m [name omitted]. And I 
thought I heard Shawn say something that I do 
want to comment on. We do have a bail statute 
now for actual innocence, for both writs. 
Armbrust:  Did it pass last year? 
Participant:  Yes. 
Armbrust:  I thought it didn’t. That’s great. 
Participant:  We have a bail statute for when the Attorney Gen-
eral is agreeing to relief. And, if I could, I would 
like to comment on sort of the public trust and in-
tegrity of the system. I think one of the things that 
helps enhance or restore the public trust is when we 
all as the government actors say: “we have identi-
fied a mistake. We have to fix it. We’re going to do 
it now.” One of the things that we do as the Office 
of the Attorney General when we agree that some-
one is entitled to relief, we ask the court to expedite 
review. We waive certain things, so we are fully 
participating in getting those cases fully resolved as 
quickly as possible. 
Participant:  Shawn gave us some examples where maybe in 
spite of the system, some innocent people were 
able to get justice. Do you have any study, any sto-
ries, where that didn’t work out? Where there are 
innocent people that you have not been able to get 
the justice they deserve? 
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Armbrust:  Yes. And in a wise political move, I am going to 
choose cases from Maryland to talk about because 
that’s just a better choice. There’s a case pending 
right now in Maryland Court of Appeals, which is 
their highest court, in which the prosecutor has 
chosen to focus purely on process. So the individ-
ual, the defendant, was convicted on a rape in the 
1980s, and there is no DNA left to test because the 
rape kit has been destroyed. And, this is a guy who 
was about 17 or 18 at the time he got arrested. And 
when he got arrested several months after the 
crime, he said to his lawyer, “Hey, at the time of 
the crime, I was working as a part-time dog 
washer. I was paid per dog, under the table. I don’t 
know if I was working that day, but maybe they’ve 
got records.” The defense attorney goes to this dog 
washing business, which is a husband and wife. 
The husband is dying. The wife says, “I don’t think 
I have records, my husband is dying. I can’t really 
look for them.” The police, the state’s attorney go 
to her. She says, “I don’t have records.” She’s sub-
poenaed to testify at trial. She says, “I don’t have 
records.” The court says, “I order to you to go look. 
If you find them, come back to us.” She doesn’t 
come back. Years later, husband is deceased. Post-
conviction attorney goes, “Sure enough, there are 
records. He was at work that day.” At the time, 
there was no way in Maryland to move for a new 
trial based on newly discovered evidence, so they 
filed an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
State said, “The lawyer was diligent. He looked for 
the records; that’s not ineffectiveness.” He loses. 
In 2009, I think it was, Maryland passed its version 
of a writ of actual innocence and the lawyer this 
time said, “Okay, it wasn’t ineffective assistance 
because the lawyer was diligent, I’m going to file a 
newly discovered evidence claim.”  The State said, 
“Well, the lawyer wasn’t diligent in seeking the re-
cords.”  And there actually is a slight gap in the law 
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between diligence for purposes of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel and diligence for purposes of 
newly discovered evidence, we tried to say there 
wasn’t but there is.  I wish there weren’t.   He won 
in the trial court.  That win was appealed by the 
State.  He lost in the intermediary appellate court, 
and it’s now up at the state highest court, but we 
don’t know what’s going to happen.  The State has 
admitted that the evidence is material, so it would 
change the outcome of trial.  But it all hinges on 
this definition of “diligence for purposes of newly 
discovered evidence.”  So that’s one of those in-
stances. I have another instance in Maryland right 
now where two years ago, we had asked for a com-
parison of a palm print. There were six palm prints 
at the point of entry that had originally been the 
main focus of the investigation.  We asked for a 
comparison, the State got a hit, we said, “Who is 
it?” they said, “We’re not going to tell you, but it is 
not one of the original suspects.”  We litigate for a 
year, we finally get the name; within five minutes, 
we determine that it was in fact one of the original 
suspects.  And it actually was an oversight, I’m not 
defending the prosecutor, but that was an oversight. 
He didn’t get the connection.  And I think we fi-
nally have a hearing coming up in April of 2016 on 
the innocence claim, which will be I think two and 
a half years after we got the palm print hit.  It’s 
someone who doesn’t know the defendant, who 
says he’s never been in the home, there was no 
other robbery at the home, so it’s a case where I 
think if we were working with a different prosecu-
tor, maybe we wouldn’t have won by now, but I 
think it would be a very different process.  Instead 
we’re probably going to be litigating this case for 
the next three to five years.  So, I think there really 
are big distinctions in the cases where you do have 
extraordinary people on board. 
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Participant:    Good afternoon, my name is [name omitted], I’m a 
third year law student.  Mr. Ramseur, my question 
is for you sir.  You mentioned how you don’t enjoy 
defending innocent persons, that they’re the biggest 
challenge.  We were also mentioning how often 
plea agreements take place, but an innocent person 
who may be convicted that pleads guilty is prohib-
ited from a writ of actual innocence in the future.  
So, in spirit of the human nature of when you think 
that somebody may be innocent, how do you pro-
ceed in advising a client who you believe to be in-
nocent but perhaps a plea is going to give them a 
better situation than the odds are looking for them? 
Ramseur:    Sure, it’s a great question.  You just have to sign a, 
frankly I acknowledge the reality of the system, 
that it makes a lot of mistakes and that most people 
get convicted.  You have to spend a lot of time and 
unfortunately, part of a lot of the job I do right now 
is spend a lot of time convincing people that they 
ought to agree to spend the rest of their lives in 
prison?  Which is not easy to do for people who’ve 
never been good decision makers in their life.  
And, because the alternative is the death penalty 
you spend time explaining to them kind of the real-
ity of what our system is, that it has shortcomings, 
that it has failures, and here is the pragmaticness 
[sic] of how do they, of what the chances of suc-
cess are for them with any of these things.  It’s ex-
tremely rare and unlikely for people to get writs of 
actual innocence granted for them, and the idea 
sometimes is, it is a kick in the teeth, the entire sys-
tem is kind of meant to bear down on you and to 
make you bend to its will and the question is, what 
do you want to get out of this in the long run?  
What’s the result that you’re trying to get to here?  
Do you want to have an opportunity to be free and 
be back to your family or do you, are you going to 
stand up and say, “No there’s no way I’ll ever ad-
mit that I did this.”  And they’re extremely hard 
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discussions and different people have to make dif-
ferent decisions for their own lives as to what is the 
right choice for them in those situations, and all I 
can do is advise them for it.  One of the things I say 
to clients, and Shawn and I have talked about this 
before, is I can’t guarantee any result for a client, 
because I don’t get to make the decision. I don’t 
have a vote on the jury. I’m not the judge. I’m not 
the prosecutor. All I can do is say, “I will work as 
hard for you as I can to try to get you the best result 
we can, but there are times when the best result 
possible is probably a very very bad one for you.”  
And so, we have to try to find a way around that 
and that’s the reality of it and that it is ultimately 
going to be their decision as to what happens, we 
are trying to make them make that decision. I hate 
having those discussions with people, it makes me 
feel very sad about our system and my role in it 
sometimes. 
And as much as I believe in our system in some 
ways—I believe in the ideology of our system.  
Ideologically, I believe there is a great way for our 
system to be.  The practical element is I know our 
system has biases, it has prejudices, and it doesn’t 
work perfectly because it is made up of humans 
who are there.  So it can be a little bit soul crushing 
sometimes, to be that way with people.  I say that I 
don’t like the innocent clients that way because you 
have to crush their souls a little bit about what the 
reality of their chances of success are in our sys-
tem.  It’s not often that people are found not guilty 
at trial—it’s rare, that way.  We hope they get it 
right we hope that’s because people are rarely 
charged in those ways but it is just not always the 
case. 
Tate:  And once you are under a life sentence instead of 
under death sentence.  Professor Gross out of 
Michigan recently did a peer-reviewed analysis and 
found a 4.1 % error rate.  He was using statistical 
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regressions and one of the cruel ironies of his 
analysis was that if you were, for some reason, no 
longer under the threat of the death sentence, you 
were getting fewer resources and less scrutiny was 
going to be invested in your case. 
And so, we are looking at possibly a 4.1 percent er-
ror rate and that error rate question is meticulously 
argued.  But we are probably in the zone of having 
to accept at a minimum you know based on the Ur-
ban Institute and whatnot, close to 5 percent, so it’s 
tough. 
Herring:  As counterintuitive as this is, though, I think the 
incidents of wrongful conviction in capital cases 
are significantly lower—perhaps because there are 
fewer capital cases—than routine felony cases.  But 
I think you stand a better chance of having some-
one proving your actual innocence in capital litiga-
tion than in run-of-the-mill felony litigation be-
cause of the resources, the lawyering, and the time 
afforded to your case.  It is very counterintuitive. 
Right? But it’s the truth. 
Ramseur:  No it’s absolutely the truth. And what I worry 
about is the ordinary injustice that happens.  The 
ordinary cases that happen every day that injustice 
happens this way.  I am fortunate I get to put a lot 
of time and effort into my cases to try to prevent it 
from being injustice in a lot of my cases. 
Armbrust:  If you look at misdemeanors, we don’t take them. 
If they are not still in prison, we’ve got 600 re-
quests per year to get through before that.  I don’t 
know if anyone read the New York Times article 
on racial profiling this weekend.  In Greensboro, 
North Carolina, a couple of the misdemeanor cases 
that they mentioned are cases that easily could have 
ended in convictions, but the misdemeanor system 
is not at all set up to test the factual accuracy of the 
claims.  People plead and they go home, and I think 
those cases get virtually no scrutiny. Capital cases 
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get significantly more, so people are more likely to 
catch mistakes when they happen. 
Ramseur:  One of the ways people are most encouraged to 
take plea agreements is because they are not home.  
They are locked up, pretrial, and they cannot afford 
a bond or a bail.  And then you tell them, “If you 
plead guilty today, then you will go home today to 
your family, with time served.” Then they will say, 
“But I didn’t do it.”  And you say, “Well, that’s 
great—trial is set for another month.”  Then people 
will go, “Okay, I will plead today because I need to 
go home today to take care of my family and that is 
more important to me.” 
That is an ordinary injustice that happens every 
single day and it is just because it makes the trains 
run on time, in some ways and it is practical for 
some people.  It is unfortunate so we have to work 
to get those resources a little bit so maybe we can 
prevent that from happening. It’s really hard. 
Tate:   It is very fitting that [name omitted] will be our last 
question, a man with a mighty background in 
criminal defense. 
 Participant:   [Name omitted] and I uh, have defended a few 
capital cases, and had a few innocent clients in-
cluding capital ones, but what I really want to do is 
comment on Mike’s suggestion that there would be 
less wrongful convictions in capital cases, than in 
other cases. And, on the one hand, it is correct that 
there are more resources available, but I think there 
are some countervailing factors. One of those is 
that it is my belief that the burden of proof switches 
more and more to the defendant the worse the 
crime is, and so that when you reach, when you 
reach capital cases, then truly the burden is on the 
defendant to prove innocence. Juries are happy to 
give people charged with breaking and entering all 
the constitutional rights to which they are entitled, 
and about which they are instructed. But you could 
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instruct them from now until next month about the 
burden of proof and the presumption of innocence 
in a nasty capital case, and I don’t think it means 
anything. So, I think the burden of proof issue 
means that you have a greater possibility. The other 
thing that you have is the wrongful convictions 
based on pleas, is amplified in capital cases be-
cause people choose to eliminate the death penalty 
in order to avoid that consequence—far more so 
than agreeing to a plea to avoid an additional ten 
years. And so if we include in the mix the people 
who plead guilty, even though they may not be, 
then I think that we really skew the results, because 
I think an awful lot of those people are saying, “I 
will do anything as long as you don’t kill me.” 
Tate:   The ultimate cost benefit question for a client. 
Armbrust:   And I think the jury.  One of the things Sam Gross, 
an academic at the University of Michigan, has 
written very powerfully about is how little we actu-
ally know about wrongful convictions. That is one 
of the questions: “Is the rate higher in capital 
cases?” Because we can talk about what the rate is 
in capital cases, but we cannot talk about it any-
where else. The National Science Foundation got a 
group of people together a few weeks ago to talk 
about wrongful conviction research in some of 
those areas where we do not know. I think those 
are some good arguments about capital cases hav-
ing a higher rate of wrongful convictions, and they 
may well be right. One of the things that I think 
people are going to be trying to do is test whether 
or not they are right so that we can learn about 
wrongful convictions because we really do know 
so little. 
Tate:   Absolutely, thank you, this was terrific paneling, I 
am going to hand it back to Caitlin. 
Kear:   Thank you all so much, just a round of applause for 
our panelists.  Thank you. We really all very much 
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appreciate you coming here today, and sharing 
such valuable opinions and insights, and experi-
ences, so, truly, thank you so much.	
